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RESULTS-ORITNTED Training Description
Course Duration
3 Days
Training Delivery Method
Classroom (Instructor-Led) or Online (Instructor-Led)
Instructors Languages
English / Arabic / Urdu / Hindi / Pashto
Certification Provider
Tamkene Saudi Training Center - Approved by TVTC (Technical and Vocational Training Corporation)
Certificate Validity
2 Years (Extendable with additional training hours)
Course Average Passing Rate
97%
Competency Assessment Criteria
Practical Assessment and Knowledge Assessment
Post Training Reporting
Post Training Report + Candidate(s) Training Evaluation Forms
Training Design Methodology
ADDIE Training Design Methodology
Certificate of Successful Completion
Certification is provided upon successful completion. The certificate can be verified through a QR-Code system.
Course Overview
Human error is cited as a contributing factor in over 80% of workplace incidents, aviation accidents, and industrial failures. Yet the term "human error" is, in isolation, analytically worthless. It tells an investigator nothing about why the error occurred, what system conditions produced it, or how to prevent recurrence. The Human Factors Assessor exists to go beyond the label — to systematically examine the cognitive, physiological, organizational, and environmental conditions that shaped human performance at the moment of failure, and to produce corrective actions that address the system rather than blame the individual.
This training course develops the competency required of Human Factors Assessors responsible for identifying, analyzing, and assessing human factors contributions to incidents, near misses, and operational failures across industrial, oil and gas, aviation, healthcare, and construction environments. The course applies the HFACS — Human Factors Analysis and Classification System developed by Shappell and Wiegmann — the most widely adopted human factors classification framework globally — and the SHELL Model (Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware-self, and Liveware-others) for structured human factors assessment. Error taxonomy follows James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model and the Dirty Dozen — Transport Canada preconditions framework. The course is aligned with ISO 45001:2018: Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems — Clause 10.2 (incident investigation and corrective action), Clause 6.1.2 (hazard identification), and Clause 5.4 (worker consultation and participation) — and ISO 9001:2015: Quality Management Systems for nonconformance and corrective action management. The ICAO Doc 9859: Safety Management Manual provides the systemic safety management context. The course applies Root Cause Analysis — RCA, Bow-Tie Analysis, and PDCA — Plan-Do-Check-Act throughout.
Key Learning Objectives
Apply the theoretical foundations of human factors — cognition, perception, memory, and decision-making — to workplace error analysis
Apply the SHELL Model to map human factors interface failures in incident scenarios
Classify human errors and violations using HFACS across all four levels — unsafe acts, preconditions, supervision, and organizational influences
Apply the Dirty Dozen framework to identify preconditions contributing to human error
Conduct a structured human factors assessment using interview, observation, and documentation review techniques
Apply RCA and Bow-Tie Analysis to identify human factors root causes and systemic barriers
Develop corrective actions targeting organizational and supervisory root causes — not individual blame
Apply human factors assessment requirements under ISO 45001:2018 Clause 10.2 and ISO 9001:2015
Integrate human factors findings into safety management system improvement per ICAO Doc 9859
Course Outline
Day 1 — Human Factors Foundations and Error Theory
1. Introduction to Human Factors Assessment
1.1 Scope and Purpose
Human error contributes to over 80% of workplace incidents — yet "human error" alone explains nothing
Human Factors Assessor role — identifying the system conditions that produced the error, not the individual who made it
Regulatory foundation — ISO 45001:2018 Clause 10.2, Clause 6.1.2, and Clause 5.4
ISO 9001:2015 Clause 10.2 — nonconformance investigation and corrective action including human factors
ICAO Doc 9859: Safety Management Manual — systemic safety management and human performance context
Just Culture principle — distinguishing between honest errors, at-risk behavior, and reckless acts
1.2 Human Performance Fundamentals
Cognition and attention — how the human brain processes information and its inherent limitations
Memory types — working memory, long-term memory, and prospective memory — and their failure modes
Situational awareness — Mica Endsley's three-level model: perception, comprehension, and projection
Decision-making under pressure — recognition-primed decision making and its breakdown under fatigue and stress
Workload and performance — the inverted-U relationship between arousal level and performance quality
Complacency — the performance degradation from over-familiarity with routine tasks
2. Error Theory and Classification
2.1 James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model
James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model — multiple defensive layers each with latent holes that align to allow incident propagation
Active failures — the visible unsafe acts of the frontline worker closest to the incident
Latent conditions — the pre-existing organizational and supervisory vulnerabilities that enabled the active failure
The assessor's focus — latent conditions produce far greater systemic risk than individual active failures
2.2 Error Taxonomy
Skill-based errors — slips and lapses during automatic routine tasks
Rule-based mistakes — misapplication of a rule to an inappropriate situation
Knowledge-based mistakes — errors in novel situations where no rule or skill exists
Violations — deliberate deviations from rules, divided into routine, situational, and exceptional
Just Culture error handling — slips and mistakes require system fixes; reckless violations require individual accountability
3. The Dirty Dozen Framework
Dirty Dozen — Transport Canada — twelve preconditions that degrade human performance and increase error probability
Lack of communication — information not transferred, incomplete, or misunderstood
Complacency — over-confidence from routine and assumption that everything is normal
Lack of knowledge — insufficient training, experience, or understanding of the task
Distraction — attention diverted from the primary task by internal or external interruptions
Lack of teamwork — poor coordination, communication breakdown, and absence of cross-checking
Fatigue — performance degradation from sleep deprivation, long shifts, and circadian disruption
Lack of resources — tools, equipment, information, or personnel unavailable for the task
Pressure — time pressure, production pressure, and social pressure to proceed unsafely
Lack of assertiveness — failure to raise a concern or stop unsafe action due to hierarchy or fear
Stress — physiological and psychological overload reducing cognitive performance
Lack of awareness — failure to recognize the hazard or its significance
Norms — the "that's how we always do it" culture that normalizes deviation from procedure
4. The SHELL Model
SHELL Model — a structured framework for mapping human factors interfaces in a work system
Liveware — the human at the centre of the model — the person whose performance is being assessed
Software — procedures, rules, checklists, training programs, and documentation
Hardware — tools, equipment, controls, displays, and physical workspace design
Environment — physical conditions including noise, lighting, temperature, and layout
Liveware-others — the team, supervisors, colleagues, and organizational culture surrounding the individual
SHELL interface failure identification — determining which interface was mismatched and why
Using SHELL as the assessment structure — systematically examining each interface before drawing conclusions
Day 2 — HFACS Assessment Methodology and Assessment Tools
5. HFACS — Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
5.1 HFACS Framework Overview
HFACS — a four-level human factors classification system based on James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model
Level 1 — Unsafe Acts: the active failures of the frontline operator
Level 2 — Preconditions for Unsafe Acts: the conditions that set up the operator to fail
Level 3 — Unsafe Supervision: supervisory failures that permitted the preconditions to exist
Level 4 — Organizational Influences: the organizational decisions and policies that created the supervisory failures
HFACS assessment direction — always assess upward from Level 1 to Level 4 to find systemic root causes
5.2 HFACS Level Application
Level 1 classification — skill-based errors, decision errors, perceptual errors, and violations
Level 2 preconditions — adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, physical or mental limitations, and environmental factors
Level 3 supervision categories — inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failed to correct known problem, and supervisory violations
Level 4 organizational categories — resource management, organizational climate, and organizational processes
HFACS classification exercise — applying all four levels to a presented incident scenario
6. Human Factors Assessment Methods
6.1 Interview Techniques
Cognitive interview technique — open recall, mental reinstatement, and probing sequence for human factors data collection
Non-leading question design — avoiding questions that suggest the answer or imply blame
Timeline reconstruction — building an accurate sequence of events from multiple witness accounts
Normalization of deviation interview — uncovering what was considered normal practice before the incident
Interview environment — private, non-threatening, and conducted as soon as practicable after the incident
6.2 Observation and Documentation Review
Task observation — watching the work as it is actually performed versus how it is procedurally described
Work-as-done versus work-as-imagined — identifying the gap between procedure and practice
Documentation review — procedure quality, training records, workload data, and shift handover records
Physical evidence collection — workplace photographs, equipment condition, and environmental measurements
Data triangulation — cross-referencing interview, observation, and documentation findings before drawing conclusions
7. Root Cause Analysis for Human Factors
7.1 RCA Integration with HFACS
RCA — Root Cause Analysis combined with HFACS — using HFACS to classify while RCA identifies causal chains
Five Why technique — drilling from the active failure to the organizational root cause through sequential questioning
Fishbone — Ishikawa — diagram for mapping human factors causes across people, process, environment, and equipment
Causal factor charting — mapping the sequence of events and conditions that combined to produce the incident
Distinguishing root cause from contributing cause — the root cause is the deepest organizational or systemic factor
7.2 Bow-Tie Analysis
Bow-Tie Analysis — mapping threats and consequences on either side of the top event with barriers between
Threat identification — the human factors and system conditions that could initiate the top event
Prevention barriers — controls that prevent the threat from reaching the top event
Recovery barriers — controls that prevent the top event from escalating to consequence
Barrier failure analysis — identifying which human factors degraded each barrier before and during the incident
Using Bow-Tie to communicate human factors risk — a visual tool for management review and corrective action planning
Day 3 — Corrective Action, Reporting, and HSE Integration
8. Developing Human Factors Corrective Actions
Corrective action hierarchy — system redesign at Level 4 is more effective than retraining at Level 1
Avoiding the blame-and-retrain trap — retraining the individual who made the error rarely prevents recurrence
Organizational corrective actions — policy revision, resource allocation, and management commitment
Supervisory corrective actions — workload management, cross-checking requirements, and safety culture change
Precondition corrective actions — fatigue management, distraction control, and communication improvement
Unsafe act corrective actions — procedure redesign, error-proofing, and checklist introduction
SMART corrective action criteria — specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound
Corrective action effectiveness verification — follow-up assessment to confirm the root cause has been eliminated
9. Human Factors Assessment Reporting
Assessment report structure — executive summary, incident description, HFACS classification, SHELL analysis, root causes, and corrective actions
Evidence-based reporting — every conclusion supported by interview, observation, or document evidence
Avoiding language that assigns individual blame — describing system conditions rather than individual fault
Corrective action tracking in the report — assigned owner, target date, and verification method
Report review and approval — peer review by a second assessor before submission
Confidentiality management — protecting witness identity in line with Just Culture principles
Lessons learned communication — sharing anonymized findings to improve organizational learning
10. Fatigue and Stress Assessment
Fatigue as the most prevalent human factors precondition in shift-based industrial operations
Fatigue Risk Management System — FRMS — per ICAO Doc 9859 — measuring and managing fatigue exposure
Fatigue assessment indicators — shift duration, consecutive days worked, sleep opportunity, and circadian disruption
Biomathematical fatigue modeling tools — SAFTE and FAID — for quantifying predicted alertness at time of incident
Stress assessment — distinguishing acute operational stress from chronic organizational stress in incident context
Pressure assessment — identifying production pressure as a systemic organizational root cause
Heat stress relevance in Middle East environments — assessing thermal load as a human performance degrader
11. HSE and Quality Management Integration
Human factors assessment as a mandatory component of incident investigation per ISO 45001:2018 Clause 10.2
Human factors in hazard identification per ISO 45001:2018 Clause 6.1.2 — proactive assessment before incidents occur
Human factors corrective action records per ISO 9001:2015 Clause 10.2 — documented, tracked, and verified
Human factors data trending — analyzing HFACS classification frequencies to identify systemic organizational vulnerabilities
Management review input — presenting human factors trend data at ISO 45001:2018 Clause 9.3 management review
Applying PDCA to the human factors assessment program — reviewing assessment quality and corrective action effectiveness quarterly
12. Case Studies and Group Discussions
Case studies from human factors failures in Middle East oil and gas, construction, and industrial environments including incidents where the root cause was organizational pressure, inadequate supervision, or fatigue — not individual error — and the importance of proper Human Factors Assessor training in identifying systemic causes and preventing recurrence
Group discussion on human factors assessment challenges in regional environments including applying Just Culture in hierarchical GCC organizational cultures, assessing fatigue in multicultural shift workforces with language barriers, and managing witness reluctance in incident interviews
Integrated assessment exercise — teams apply SHELL, HFACS, Dirty Dozen, and RCA to a presented incident scenario, complete the assessment report structure, develop SMART corrective actions at all four HFACS levels, and present findings for facilitator and peer review
Day 1 — Human Factors Foundations and Error Theory
1. Introduction to Human Factors Assessment
1.1 Scope and Purpose
Human error contributes to over 80% of workplace incidents — yet "human error" alone explains nothing
Human Factors Assessor role — identifying the system conditions that produced the error, not the individual who made it
Regulatory foundation — ISO 45001:2018 Clause 10.2, Clause 6.1.2, and Clause 5.4
ISO 9001:2015 Clause 10.2 — nonconformance investigation and corrective action including human factors
ICAO Doc 9859: Safety Management Manual — systemic safety management and human performance context
Just Culture principle — distinguishing between honest errors, at-risk behavior, and reckless acts
1.2 Human Performance Fundamentals
Cognition and attention — how the human brain processes information and its inherent limitations
Memory types — working memory, long-term memory, and prospective memory — and their failure modes
Situational awareness — Mica Endsley's three-level model: perception, comprehension, and projection
Decision-making under pressure — recognition-primed decision making and its breakdown under fatigue and stress
Workload and performance — the inverted-U relationship between arousal level and performance quality
Complacency — the performance degradation from over-familiarity with routine tasks
2. Error Theory and Classification
2.1 James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model
James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model — multiple defensive layers each with latent holes that align to allow incident propagation
Active failures — the visible unsafe acts of the frontline worker closest to the incident
Latent conditions — the pre-existing organizational and supervisory vulnerabilities that enabled the active failure
The assessor's focus — latent conditions produce far greater systemic risk than individual active failures
2.2 Error Taxonomy
Skill-based errors — slips and lapses during automatic routine tasks
Rule-based mistakes — misapplication of a rule to an inappropriate situation
Knowledge-based mistakes — errors in novel situations where no rule or skill exists
Violations — deliberate deviations from rules, divided into routine, situational, and exceptional
Just Culture error handling — slips and mistakes require system fixes; reckless violations require individual accountability
3. The Dirty Dozen Framework
Dirty Dozen — Transport Canada — twelve preconditions that degrade human performance and increase error probability
Lack of communication — information not transferred, incomplete, or misunderstood
Complacency — over-confidence from routine and assumption that everything is normal
Lack of knowledge — insufficient training, experience, or understanding of the task
Distraction — attention diverted from the primary task by internal or external interruptions
Lack of teamwork — poor coordination, communication breakdown, and absence of cross-checking
Fatigue — performance degradation from sleep deprivation, long shifts, and circadian disruption
Lack of resources — tools, equipment, information, or personnel unavailable for the task
Pressure — time pressure, production pressure, and social pressure to proceed unsafely
Lack of assertiveness — failure to raise a concern or stop unsafe action due to hierarchy or fear
Stress — physiological and psychological overload reducing cognitive performance
Lack of awareness — failure to recognize the hazard or its significance
Norms — the "that's how we always do it" culture that normalizes deviation from procedure
4. The SHELL Model
SHELL Model — a structured framework for mapping human factors interfaces in a work system
Liveware — the human at the centre of the model — the person whose performance is being assessed
Software — procedures, rules, checklists, training programs, and documentation
Hardware — tools, equipment, controls, displays, and physical workspace design
Environment — physical conditions including noise, lighting, temperature, and layout
Liveware-others — the team, supervisors, colleagues, and organizational culture surrounding the individual
SHELL interface failure identification — determining which interface was mismatched and why
Using SHELL as the assessment structure — systematically examining each interface before drawing conclusions
Day 2 — HFACS Assessment Methodology and Assessment Tools
5. HFACS — Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
5.1 HFACS Framework Overview
HFACS — a four-level human factors classification system based on James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model
Level 1 — Unsafe Acts: the active failures of the frontline operator
Level 2 — Preconditions for Unsafe Acts: the conditions that set up the operator to fail
Level 3 — Unsafe Supervision: supervisory failures that permitted the preconditions to exist
Level 4 — Organizational Influences: the organizational decisions and policies that created the supervisory failures
HFACS assessment direction — always assess upward from Level 1 to Level 4 to find systemic root causes
5.2 HFACS Level Application
Level 1 classification — skill-based errors, decision errors, perceptual errors, and violations
Level 2 preconditions — adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, physical or mental limitations, and environmental factors
Level 3 supervision categories — inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failed to correct known problem, and supervisory violations
Level 4 organizational categories — resource management, organizational climate, and organizational processes
HFACS classification exercise — applying all four levels to a presented incident scenario
6. Human Factors Assessment Methods
6.1 Interview Techniques
Cognitive interview technique — open recall, mental reinstatement, and probing sequence for human factors data collection
Non-leading question design — avoiding questions that suggest the answer or imply blame
Timeline reconstruction — building an accurate sequence of events from multiple witness accounts
Normalization of deviation interview — uncovering what was considered normal practice before the incident
Interview environment — private, non-threatening, and conducted as soon as practicable after the incident
6.2 Observation and Documentation Review
Task observation — watching the work as it is actually performed versus how it is procedurally described
Work-as-done versus work-as-imagined — identifying the gap between procedure and practice
Documentation review — procedure quality, training records, workload data, and shift handover records
Physical evidence collection — workplace photographs, equipment condition, and environmental measurements
Data triangulation — cross-referencing interview, observation, and documentation findings before drawing conclusions
7. Root Cause Analysis for Human Factors
7.1 RCA Integration with HFACS
RCA — Root Cause Analysis combined with HFACS — using HFACS to classify while RCA identifies causal chains
Five Why technique — drilling from the active failure to the organizational root cause through sequential questioning
Fishbone — Ishikawa — diagram for mapping human factors causes across people, process, environment, and equipment
Causal factor charting — mapping the sequence of events and conditions that combined to produce the incident
Distinguishing root cause from contributing cause — the root cause is the deepest organizational or systemic factor
7.2 Bow-Tie Analysis
Bow-Tie Analysis — mapping threats and consequences on either side of the top event with barriers between
Threat identification — the human factors and system conditions that could initiate the top event
Prevention barriers — controls that prevent the threat from reaching the top event
Recovery barriers — controls that prevent the top event from escalating to consequence
Barrier failure analysis — identifying which human factors degraded each barrier before and during the incident
Using Bow-Tie to communicate human factors risk — a visual tool for management review and corrective action planning
Day 3 — Corrective Action, Reporting, and HSE Integration
8. Developing Human Factors Corrective Actions
Corrective action hierarchy — system redesign at Level 4 is more effective than retraining at Level 1
Avoiding the blame-and-retrain trap — retraining the individual who made the error rarely prevents recurrence
Organizational corrective actions — policy revision, resource allocation, and management commitment
Supervisory corrective actions — workload management, cross-checking requirements, and safety culture change
Precondition corrective actions — fatigue management, distraction control, and communication improvement
Unsafe act corrective actions — procedure redesign, error-proofing, and checklist introduction
SMART corrective action criteria — specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound
Corrective action effectiveness verification — follow-up assessment to confirm the root cause has been eliminated
9. Human Factors Assessment Reporting
Assessment report structure — executive summary, incident description, HFACS classification, SHELL analysis, root causes, and corrective actions
Evidence-based reporting — every conclusion supported by interview, observation, or document evidence
Avoiding language that assigns individual blame — describing system conditions rather than individual fault
Corrective action tracking in the report — assigned owner, target date, and verification method
Report review and approval — peer review by a second assessor before submission
Confidentiality management — protecting witness identity in line with Just Culture principles
Lessons learned communication — sharing anonymized findings to improve organizational learning
10. Fatigue and Stress Assessment
Fatigue as the most prevalent human factors precondition in shift-based industrial operations
Fatigue Risk Management System — FRMS — per ICAO Doc 9859 — measuring and managing fatigue exposure
Fatigue assessment indicators — shift duration, consecutive days worked, sleep opportunity, and circadian disruption
Biomathematical fatigue modeling tools — SAFTE and FAID — for quantifying predicted alertness at time of incident
Stress assessment — distinguishing acute operational stress from chronic organizational stress in incident context
Pressure assessment — identifying production pressure as a systemic organizational root cause
Heat stress relevance in Middle East environments — assessing thermal load as a human performance degrader
11. HSE and Quality Management Integration
Human factors assessment as a mandatory component of incident investigation per ISO 45001:2018 Clause 10.2
Human factors in hazard identification per ISO 45001:2018 Clause 6.1.2 — proactive assessment before incidents occur
Human factors corrective action records per ISO 9001:2015 Clause 10.2 — documented, tracked, and verified
Human factors data trending — analyzing HFACS classification frequencies to identify systemic organizational vulnerabilities
Management review input — presenting human factors trend data at ISO 45001:2018 Clause 9.3 management review
Applying PDCA to the human factors assessment program — reviewing assessment quality and corrective action effectiveness quarterly
12. Case Studies and Group Discussions
Case studies from human factors failures in Middle East oil and gas, construction, and industrial environments including incidents where the root cause was organizational pressure, inadequate supervision, or fatigue — not individual error — and the importance of proper Human Factors Assessor training in identifying systemic causes and preventing recurrence
Group discussion on human factors assessment challenges in regional environments including applying Just Culture in hierarchical GCC organizational cultures, assessing fatigue in multicultural shift workforces with language barriers, and managing witness reluctance in incident interviews
Integrated assessment exercise — teams apply SHELL, HFACS, Dirty Dozen, and RCA to a presented incident scenario, complete the assessment report structure, develop SMART corrective actions at all four HFACS levels, and present findings for facilitator and peer review
Group Exercises
Integrated human factors assessment workshop — teams apply SHELL, HFACS, Dirty Dozen, RCA, and Bow-Tie to a presented Middle East industrial incident scenario, complete the full assessment report, and develop a corrective action plan for presentation and peer review
Human factors trend analysis exercise — groups analyze a presented dataset of HFACS classifications from 12 months of incidents, identify the dominant systemic vulnerabilities at organizational and supervisory levels, and develop a targeted improvement program for management review
Gained Core Technical Skills
Ability to apply Swiss Cheese Model, error taxonomy, and Just Culture principles to distinguish systemic root causes from individual active failures
Proficiency in applying the Dirty Dozen framework to identify the twelve preconditions that degraded human performance before an incident
Competency in applying the SHELL Model to systematically assess Software, Hardware, Environment, and Liveware interface failures in any incident scenario
Skill in classifying human factors across all four HFACS levels — unsafe acts, preconditions, supervision, and organizational influences — with evidence-based justification
Ability to conduct structured cognitive interviews, task observations, and documentation reviews — and triangulate findings before drawing assessment conclusions
Proficiency in applying RCA Five Why and Bow-Tie Analysis to identify organizational and supervisory root causes and degraded barriers
Competency in developing SMART corrective actions targeting all four HFACS levels — with particular depth at organizational and supervisory levels
Skill in producing human factors assessment reports that are evidence-based, Just Culture compliant, and contain verified corrective actions per ISO 45001:2018 and ISO 9001:2015
Ability to trend HFACS classification data across incident datasets to identify systemic organizational vulnerabilities and develop targeted improvement programs for management review
Services Geographical Coverage
In Tamkene Training Center or at our client's facility (On-Site), Covering All Saudi Arabia Cities and Locations:
Targeted Audience
HSE engineers and incident investigators responsible for conducting human factors assessments as part of formal incident investigation programs
Quality managers and nonconformance investigators who need human factors competency to identify systemic root causes in ISO 9001 corrective action processes
Operations managers and supervisors responsible for understanding human performance limitations and designing work systems that reduce error probability
Safety management system professionals responsible for integrating human factors assessment into ISO 45001:2018 hazard identification and incident investigation
Risk managers and process safety engineers applying human factors analysis to barrier degradation assessment and Bow-Tie risk modeling
Any professional responsible for investigating incidents, assessing human performance, or developing corrective actions in safety-critical industrial, oil and gas, construction, or operational environments
Practical Assessment
HFACS classification exercise — classifying a presented set of incident behaviors and conditions across all four HFACS levels and justifying each classification with evidence from the scenario
Human factors interview practical — conducting a structured cognitive interview for a presented incident scenario, applying non-leading questioning, and documenting findings in the assessment report format
Corrective action development exercise — developing a SMART corrective action plan targeting all four HFACS levels for a presented root cause analysis outcome — assessed for systemic depth and measurability
Knowledge Assessment
Theory questions — Swiss Cheese Model active failure versus latent condition distinction, Dirty Dozen precondition identification from a described scenario, SHELL interface failure classification, and Mica Endsley situational awareness level breakdown
HFACS classification questions — correctly classifying described behaviors at all four HFACS levels, distinguishing violations from mistakes, and identifying the organizational influence category for a described management failure
Assessment method questions — cognitive interview sequence, work-as-done versus work-as-imagined distinction, data triangulation purpose, and non-leading question design rule
Corrective action and reporting questions — corrective action hierarchy level effectiveness order, SMART criteria application, Just Culture confidentiality obligation, and ISO 45001:2018 Clause 10.2 corrective action verification requirement
Why Choose This Course
Aligned with ISO 45001:2018 Clauses 5.4, 6.1.2, 9.3, and 10.2, ISO 9001:2015 Clause 10.2, and ICAO Doc 9859: Safety Management Manual
Integrates SHELL, HFACS, Dirty Dozen, Swiss Cheese Model, RCA, and Bow-Tie into a single coherent assessment methodology
HFACS four-level classification is practiced at assessor depth — developing the ability to move beyond surface-level error labeling to organizational root cause identification
Just Culture integration develops assessors who produce reports that organizations act on rather than file — because the findings are systemic, not personal
Human factors trend analysis competency develops the management-level insight that transforms individual incident findings into organizational safety improvement programs
Incorporates Middle East human factors challenges including heat stress as a performance degrader, hierarchical culture barriers to Just Culture implementation, and fatigue assessment in multicultural shift operations across GCC industrial environments
Note: This course outline, including specific topics, modules, and duration, can be customized based on the specific needs and requirements of the client.
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